However, the online shopping method also causes serious information asymmetry between the online seller and the buyer, which leads to frequent problems in the quality of online shopping products. The 2018 China E-Commerce User Experience and Complaint Monitoring Report [2] shows: In 2018, complaints received by the e-commerce consumer dispute mediation platform increased by 38.36% year-on-year, among which retail e-commerce complaints accounted for the highest proportion of all complaints, reaching 62.55%. Among the national e-commerce complaint hot issues, the quality of the product is second only to the issue of refunds. For green products, the quality of products should be measured from two aspects, one is the environmental quality of the products, and the other is the quality of the products themselves, which undoubtedly increases the difficulty of quality supervision of green products, coupled with the shortcomings of online shopping, the quality supervision of online shopping green products is more difficult to solve.
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With the continuous deepening of the supply-side structural reforms, the e-commerce environment is required to be more standardized, and the public's awareness of rights protection and environmental awareness are increasing, and more and more appeal to high quality green products. How to strengthen the quality supervision of online shopping green products, protect the legitimate rights and interests of consumers, caused the government supervision departments, e-commerce platforms, scholars and consumers to think deeply. The quality supervision of online shopping green products involves multiple stakeholders, and the information asymmetry in the e-commerce environment makes it difficult to purify the market environment by relying solely on the supervision of government departments. Therefore, this paper introduces the multi-party entities such as the government supervision department, the e-commerce platform, the online seller and consumer closely related to the quality supervision of online shopping green products into the evolutionary game model. Under the consideration of the collusion behavior between the e-commerce platform and the online seller, the evolutionary stability strategies of each player are analyzed, and the influencing factors of the strategic choices of all entities are explored. This paper uses Matlab 2017 for simulation analysis and provides effective advice on how to urge the government supervision department to effectively supervise, promote the e-commerce platform to enhance review, urge the online seller to legal sale, and encourage consumers feedback which to legally defend their rights.
Online shopping has made consumer shopping break through the limitations of time and space, but it also brings difficulties to consumer decision-making. An e-commerce environment results in information asymmetry because buyers cannot communicate the quality of products and easily assess the trustworthiness of sellers [3]. Consumers abandon their online purchases at an e-commerce website partly due to the lack of information transparency of the website [4]. In order to retain consumers, online vendors can effectively overcome product-level uncertainty by taking advantage of retailer reputation in the physical world and through the use of digitized video commercials [5]. However, although information asymmetry leads consumers to have less trust in the quality of online shopping products, but there are indeed some consumers who have demand for fake and shoddy products [6]. This consumer demand has created a convergence effect in the online shopping market, which will attract low quality businesses and products into the market [7]. Therefore, with the popularity of online shopping, more and more consumers choose online shopping, and the problem of products quality is also becoming more and more serious.
However, in a highly competitive market environment, the participating entities are often driven by interests, adopting some negative strategies or even illegal activities, and relying solely on the self-restraint of the participating entities cannot effectively guarantee the quality of online shopping products. Therefore, some scholars believe that in addition to the low level of product quality efforts from sellers and product suppliers, the lack of effective supervision of product quality is also one of the main reasons for online shopping product quality problem. The e-commerce platform plays the most important role and it is the key for the smooth operation of the three-level product quality control system. The e-commerce platform also controls and guides the seller's activities of mitigating product quality uncertainty and improves the quality of products [13]. However, government quality supervision department and e-commerce platforms will be affected by factors such as regulatory costs, penalties, profits, and awards when determining regulatory strategies [14]. Other than this, third-party product evaluation agencies undertake the task of checking and testing product quality in the market, establish the quality level of products, and pass information to consumers [15].
The online seller provides high quality green products with the probability of x, and provides low quality green products with the probability of (1-x); the e-commerce platform chooses non-collusion with the probability of y, and chooses collusion with the probability of (1-y); the government supervision department chooses strict supervision with the probability of z, and chooses loose supervision with the probability of (1-z). The cost of providing high quality green products is Csh, the cost of providing low quality green products is Csl (Csh>Csl>0). The cost of strict supervision by government supervision department is Cgy, the cost of loose supervision is Cgk (Cgy>Cgk>0).
Consumer rights will be guaranteed when the online seller provides high quality green products. At this point, consumers will make positive feedback such as praise. This brings additional benefits Es and Ep to the online seller and e-commerce platform. Conversely, when collusion occurs and low quality green products enter the market, negative feedback (such as bad reviews) will be made by consumers.
When the e-commerce platform chooses non-collusion and actively assumes the responsibility of quality review, the cost of review is Cp1. At this time, if the online seller provides low quality green products, it will be subject to punishment from the e-commerce platform, the penalty amount is P; if the online seller provides high quality green products, the e-commerce platform will give it appropriate rewards. The amount of the reward is R.
Proposition 1 When yy*, the evolutionary stability strategy of the online seller is to provide high quality green products; when y = y*, there is no evolutionary stability strategy for the online seller.
Let volume Vs1 represents the probability that the online seller chooses the "provide low quality green products" strategy, and Vs2 represents the probability of selecting the "provide high quality green products" strategy.
Corollary 1 indicates that if the e-commerce platform is not collusive, it will actively undertake the responsibility of quality review. Once the online seller provides low quality green products, it will be discovered by the strict review system and be punished by the e-commerce platform. The online seller tends to adopt a strategy of providing high quality green products.
Corollary 2 The increase of additional benefit brought by the positive feedback from the consumers and the increase of loss caused by the negative feedback from the consumers to the online seller can effectively prevent the online seller from providing low quality green products.
Corollary 2 shows that consumers will give feedback on online shopping green products such as online praise or bad reviews. This kind of feedback will affect the reputation of the online seller, and will also influence the decision-making of other buyers, thus becoming a factor of particular concern for the online seller. The increase in the amount of the additional profit brought by positive feedback from consumers and the losses caused by negative feedback from consumers to the online seller will have a significant impact on the strategic choice of the online seller. In order to establish a good reputation and maintain long-term development, the online seller will consciously reduce the probability of providing low quality green products.
Corollary 3 The e-commerce platform establishes a strict review system to increase the amount of incentives for providing high quality green products to the online seller and the amount of penalties for providing low quality green products, which can prevent low quality products from being offered by the online seller.
Corollary 3 indicates that during the online shopping process, the e-commerce platform bears the responsibility of third-party credit and quality supervision, and the establishment of a strict review system for the e-commerce platform is crucial for green product quality supervision. But the online seller can effectively avoid the punishment from the e-commerce platform by means of modern advanced technology. Therefore, in addition to the strict punishment system, the e-commerce platform can increase the incentive amount for the credited online sellers, in order to stop the online seller from providing low quality green products.
Corollary 4 The government supervision department can smooth complaint channels and increase the probability of complaints from consumers, so as to reduce the probability of low quality green products offered by the online seller.
Corollary 8 As the probability of the online seller choosing to provide high quality green product and the probability of the e-commerce platform selecting non-collusion strategy increase, the probability that the government supervision department chooses the strict supervision strategy will decrease. 2ff7e9595c
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